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Abstract 
 
Even with well-developed capital markets, there is no private market mechanism 
for trading between current and future generations.  This generates a potential role 
for public old-age pension systems to spread economic and demographic shocks 
among different generations.  This paper evaluates how different systems smooth 
and propagate shocks to productivity, fertility, mortality and migration in a 
realistic OLG model.  We use reductions in the variance of wealth equivalents to 
measure performance, starting with the existing U.S. system as a unifying 
framework, in which we vary how much taxes and benefits adjust, and which we 
then compare to the existing German and Swedish systems.  We find that system 
design and shock type are key factors.  The German system and the benefit-
adjustment-only U.S. system best smooth productivity shocks, which are by far 
the most important shocks.  Overall, the German system performs best, while the 
Swedish system, which includes a buffer stock to relax annual budget constraints, 
performs rather poorly.  Focusing on the U.S. system, reliance solely on tax 
adjustment fares best for mortality and migration shocks, while equal reliance on 
tax and benefit adjustments is best for fertility shocks.  
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1. Introduction  
 While the main function of old-age pension systems is to provide resources to elderly 
retirees, these systems can satisfy many other important government functions as well.  Indeed, 
in circumstances where access to capital markets is good and many individuals can, alone or in 
conjunction with private employers, save for retirement, broad-based public pension systems 
may not be needed simply to provide retirement income and their other functions may take on 
greater prominence.  One such function is the allocation and spreading of economic and 
demographic shocks among generations.  Even with well-developed capital markets and informal 
family arrangements, there is no private market mechanism for trading between current and 
future generations, leaving government policy as the only broad-based option.  A range of 
government policies, including national debt management, infrastructure investment, and public 
education expenditures, have important intergenerational consequences, but the size and variety 
of public pension schemes make them a natural place to focus for intergenerational policy. 
 Like private defined-contribution pension arrangements, funded defined-contribution 
public pension schemes result in one particular allocation of economic and demographic shocks 
among generations.  For example, a demographic shock that leads to one age cohort being large 
relative to others will lead that cohort to experience relatively low lifetime wages (because of its 
high labor supply) and relatively low rates of return on its retirement saving (because of its high 
demand for retirement assets).  But public schemes may deviate from the defined-contribution 
approach with respect to two criteria: asset accumulation and determination of contributions and 
benefits.  With respect to the first criterion, systems may adhere to some form of strict pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) approach, or to a more flexible approach that allows a fluctuation in the 
system’s financial assets or liabilities within some stable range.  With respect to the second 
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criterion, systems may adjust either contributions or benefits to maintain financial stability, and 
when adjusting benefits may adjust them immediately or in the future.   
 This paper relates to a large literature that studies how aggregate and idiosyncratic risks 
are shared in models with inter-generational linkages, starting with Diamond (1977).1  Our main 
contribution to this literature is to analyze how specific demographic and economic shocks 
policymakers are concerned about propagate through different versions of public pension 
systems currently employed or proposed in different countries.  
 Two earlier papers (Auerbach and Lee 2009, 2011) studied a variety of existing and 
hypothetical unfunded arrangements.  These included the actual and hypothetical Swedish 
systems, the actual German system, and three stable variants of the existing U.S. social security 
system, evaluated according to a variety of welfare criteria, such as internal rates of return and an 
approximation of expected utility.  Our findings, particularly in the second paper, suggested that 
the methods of spreading shocks across generations can have significant effects on welfare.  But 
questions remain about the channels through which these effects operate.2 
 Understanding the effects of an existing or proposed system on welfare is, ultimately, our 
objective in studying the spreading of shocks.  However, we would also like to understand why 
certain systems seem to perform better in the welfare dimension and how other potential systems 
would perform in response to different patterns of shocks.  Our past welfare analysis was based 
on empirically estimated demographic and economic stochastic processes for the United States, 
                                                 
1 This literature is too large to summarize adequately here and we refer the reader to the excellent surveys by 
Feldstein and Liebman (2002) and Attanasio et al. (2016).  Two more recent extensions of the overlapping 
generations (OLG) framework developed by Diamond (1977) worth mentioning in our context are Shiller (1999) 
and Bohn (2009), who show that public pension systems can reduce consumption risk of all generations.     
2 Other studies that analyze specific designs of public pensions include Matsen and Thogersen (2004), who 
investigate the optimal mix between PAYG and fully funded systems, Krueger and Kubler (2006), who study the 
welfare benefits of a minimum pension, and Ludwig and Reiter (2010), who ask how pension systems perform in 
smoothing fertility shocks.  
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but patterns in the future or in other countries may differ; it would be useful to have a more 
general picture of how different systems perform in response to different types and patterns of 
shocks.  Using the stochastic modeling approach of our previous work, by looking only at the 
particular shocks of interest, one at a time, is difficult because each type of shock has complex 
economic effects and channels that cannot be determined without an explicit general equilibrium 
model.  Thus, we utilize a modified version of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987) dynamic general-
equilibrium OLG model that incorporates realistic patterns of fertility and mortality and shocks 
to productivity, fertility, mortality and migration.  While this model is well adapted for our 
purposes, it is worth highlighting some limitations of our analysis. 
 One issue concerns the fact that, although we model the responses of the economy to a 
range of shocks, the model is effectively deterministic, in the sense that households do not 
anticipate the shocks and respond to them after they occur.  In particular, due to the complexity 
of our model economy and the particular counterfactuals we study, we abstract from modeling 
aggregate or idiosyncratic uncertainty.  Although recent studies have made substantial progress 
in incorporating aggregate shocks into realistic large-scale OLG models, these models are still 
too limited to deal with our setting.  For instance, Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2013) incorporate 
aggregate productivity shocks in a large-scale OLG model with a Social Security system that is 
simpler than ours and does not incorporate demographic changes.  Rios-Rull (2001) on the other 
hand incorporates stochastic population changes but does not include government and hence 
cannot study the role social security plays in propagating or smoothing of these shocks.  The 
latter study, like much of the literature analyzing aggregate shocks such as Krueger and Kubler 
(2006) and Ludwig and Reiter (2010), also analyzes such shocks using a quadratic 
approximation of the full rational expectations equilibrium around a deterministic steady state.   
 4 
 Other studies incorporate idiosyncratic risks but not aggregate uncertainty.  The models 
by Hong and Rios-Rull (2007) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) for example feature a 
simplified version of social security and idiosyncratic demographic shocks, but no aggregate 
uncertainty.  The latter study finds that even allowing for idiosyncratic shocks “significantly 
increases the complexity of the model and the required computation time from several hours to 
typically several days per simulation.”  While we do incorporate uncertainty with respect to 
mortality in our model, we couple it with an assumption of complete annuity markets, so that 
household saving decisions are not affected. 
 One limitation of our study is therefore the absence of precautionary savings as an 
element of the household’s intertemporal optimization, and we leave such an analysis to future 
research.  However, it is worth pointing out that since our study focuses on the comparison of the 
dynamic responses across different social security systems, it is not obvious whether and to what 
extent the existence of precautionary savings would change these relative comparisons.  A 
second limitation, associated with the absence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, is that while we can 
and do evaluate the spreading of shocks across generations, we cannot analyze risk-sharing 
within generations.  Finally, in studying shocks around the steady state of an economy, we limit 
our consideration to shocks that, though potentially of very long duration, are not permanent. 
 Our analysis yields several interesting results.  First, for our calibration based on U.S. 
historical experience, productivity shocks are the most important source of welfare volatility, so 
success at smoothing such shocks could be quite valuable.  Yet no system is particularly 
effective at smoothing productivity shocks, because the tax cuts or benefit increases that positive 
productivity shocks make feasible generally aid cohorts already gaining from the productivity 
shock.  However, among variants of the U.S. social security system, reliance on benefit 
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adjustment smooths such shocks most effectively, as retirees’ direct gains from the shocks 
themselves are smaller than are those of workers.  
Adjustments in response to fertility shocks, the second most important shocks, are more 
effective when relying on a mix of tax and benefit adjustments, because cohorts hurt by the 
initial shock in different ways (a decline in wages from an increased labor force vs. reduced 
consumption due to larger families) are helped differentially by tax and benefit adjustments.  For 
mortality and migration shocks, which in our calibration are the least important and generate 
roughly equal amounts of volatility in well-being, tax adjustments are better at smoothing, 
because these shocks affect workers most – migration shocks because of increased labor-market 
competition, mortality shocks because of less need for resources among the elderly.  Also, social 
security has a greater ability to smooth shocks in these cases than for productivity and fertility 
shocks, because the initial effects of the shocks themselves are less widespread.   
An important lesson from our analysis is that, even where smoothing is possible, some 
combinations of tax and benefit adjustments fail to smooth shocks.  In fact, some social security 
systems actually concentrate the effects of shocks for certain parameterizations and shocks.  For 
example, while reliance primarily on tax adjustments effectively smooths the migration shock, 
this is not the case when the primary adjustment is through benefits.   
Finally, considering the performance of the German and Swedish systems, we find that 
the German system performs well overall relative to the U.S. system, successfully combining tax 
and benefit adjustments in smoothing different shocks.  The Swedish system, on the other hand, 
performs rather poorly except in the case of the fertility shock, even though it alone has a buffer 
stock mechanism that relaxes the requirement of short-run cash-flow balance. 
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2. The Model 
 The model we use is adapted from that laid out in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 
11) and used subsequently by Auerbach et al. (1989) to evaluate the economic effects of public 
pension systems in several countries.  That original model was a perfect foresight, dynamic 
general equilibrium model with variations in fertility that permitted analysis of the interactions of 
demographic transitions and different public pension systems.  However, several modifications 
are needed to make that model suitable for the current task.  In particular, the model had a very 
simplistic approach to fertility, assuming that it was concentrated at one age, had no individual 
uncertainty as to life expectancy, no migration, and assumed a smooth rate of productivity 
growth.  We will go through the newly adapted version of the model, indicating how we use it to 
measure the effects of shocks to productivity, fertility, mortality, and migration. 
 In the model, individuals live for up to T years, spending the first 20 as minor dependents 
of parents who make consumption decisions on their behalf.  At any given time, the household 
consists of one parent and any minor children.  Household utility in each year is based on the 
parent’s consumption and leisure and each child’s consumption.  The household maximizes 
lifetime family utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint.  Each age cohort of adults consists 
of individuals who are identical, ex ante, but who have different mortality experience. 3  
 For simplicity, we assume that live children are born to parents between the ages of 21 
and 40, and that mortality begins at age 60, after children have left the home. This means that 
there are no orphan children, which would add complexity to the model.4  We assume that births 
                                                 
3 Note that while we assume a distribution of births across childbearing ages, we treat these births as deterministic, 
with the representative household having this entire distribution. 
4 Although relaxing this assumption would be desirable in principle, it would not be of major quantitative 
importance.  In the US life table for 2005-2009, only 9 percent of female births die before age 60, and of those who 
survive to begin childbearing at age 20, only 8 percent die before 60.  The probability that both parents would die 
before 60 in a more realistic model with two parents for each child would be less than 1 percent.  
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follow a baseline age-specific fertility profile za between ages 21 and 40, which may be shifted 
by an AR(1) shock ζt so that fertility at age a and date t – the number of children born to a 
household of age a in year t – is fat =  zaζt.  The baseline mortality hazard rate for age a at date t 
is ma.  We assume that this vector of age-specific mortality rates can be hit by a multiplicative 
shock that also follows an AR(1) process, µt, so that the survival probability hazard for age a and 
date t is sat = (1- maµt).  We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are no trends or 
aggregate uncertainty in the probability age profiles of either fertility or mortality. 
 As to intergenerational linkages after children become adults, we assume that there are no 
inter vivos gifts or intentional bequests.  Given uncertain lifetimes, though, individuals dying 
before age T could still leave accidental bequests.  Rather than dealing with accidental bequests 
at different ages, which would make solution of the model extremely complicated, we assume 
perfect Yaari annuity markets, so that individuals fully annuitize their retirement savings and 
therefore leave no bequests regardless of when they die.  This means that the adjusted return to 
saving should equal atnt sr /)1( +  for age-a individuals at date t, where 
n
tr  is the net, after-tax rate 
of return on capital at date t.  Note that the combination of mortality and perfect annuity markets 
should leave the household optimization problem unaffected, as higher rates of return on 
annuities will just offset higher discount rates induced by mortality.  That is, even though the 
household’s objective function now incorporates expected mortality, we can determine the 
household’s optimal planned consumption and labor supply paths (contingent on survival) 
ignoring mortality in both the objective function and the rate of return. 
 Figure 1 displays our baseline fertility and mortality hazard probabilities.  These are for 
the United States, taken from the Human Mortality Database and the Human Fertility Database 
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for 2010,5 except that, to accommodate modeling assumptions, values for fertility are set to zero 
below age 21 and above age 40, and values of mortality are set to zero for ages below 60.6   
 We assume that the household maximizes a lifetime family utility function that is time-
separable, separable across individuals, and having a nested CES structure for adults within 
periods (between consumption and leisure) and between periods.  Taking fertility and mortality 
into account, the household’s objective function at age 21 may be written: 
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where Ca,t is adult consumption at age a in year t, la,t is the corresponding leisure, H(a)k,t is the 
consumption of a child of age k in year t for a parent of age a, T is maximum life (set to 100 in 
our simulations), D is the maximum age of child-bearing (here, assumed to be age 40), and G is 
the age after which children are adults and leaders of their own families (here, assumed to be 20).  
As in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), the terms ωk are weights of children in the utility function 
which are assumed to increase linearly from 0.25 at age 1 to 0.50 at age 20, i.e., ωk = .25 + 
.25*(k-1)/19.  In expression (1), there are also four household preference parameters: δ is the 
pure rate of time preference, α is the leisure intensity parameter, ρ is the intratemporal elasticity 
of substitution between consumption and leisure, and γ is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution over consumption (and, in the case of adults, leisure as well) at different dates.  
Following the calibration in Auerbach et al. (1989), we set the last three parameters equal to 1.5, 
0.8, and 0.35, respectively.  We choose the final parameter, δ, to target the historical postwar 
                                                 
5 The data are available at http://www.mortality.org/ and http://www.humanfertility.org/cgi-bin/main.php. 
6 We inflate the remaining fertility profile to offset the excluded years of fertility in order to produce the same 
number of births per adult as for the full fertility profile.  We do not adjust the mortality profile, which gives us the 
correct measure of life expectancy at age 60, although overstating life expectancy at earlier ages. 
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U.S. before-tax rate of return to capital measured in Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Koehler (2016), 
just under 6.5 percent.  The resulting value for δ is -.015.7  The household maximizes utility as 
defined in (1) subject to a budget constraint that equates the present value of household 
consumption to the present value of after-tax labor income plus pension benefits. 
 The economy has one production sector, with a representative competitive firm 
producing output subject to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function in capital and 
labor.  Hence there are no pure profits, with returns to capital and labor exhausting the firm’s 
income.  The economy is closed in the initial simulations we consider, so the production sector’s 
capital stock is determined by household plus government asset accumulation.  Labor equals the 
sum of labor supplied by cohorts of different ages, where we assume that different ages of labor 
are perfect substitutes but differentially efficient as described by  an empirically estimated age-
based efficiency profile, ea, also taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
 We assume that individuals work starting at age 21, with the retirement age endogenously 
determined (as the age at which zero labor supply is optimal) by preferences and factor prices.  
This retirement age is distinct from the initial age of benefit receipt, which we set at 67 for all 
social security systems considered, consistent with the normal retirement age under the current 
U.S. system once it is fully phased in.  There is a deterministic trend in total factor productivity 
growth, at a rate of 1.5 percent per year, which is implemented in two pieces: greater steepness in 
the efficiency profile, ea, plus a trend in the labor endowment, which increases equally the 
individual’s efficiency at supplying labor and in consuming leisure.  This method produces the 
right wage profile for each cohort but also avoids any trend in the work/leisure ratio, as discussed 
in Auerbach et al. (1989).  We assume the presence of multiplicative productivity shocks around 
                                                 
7 One may rationalize this low time preference rate as offsetting the model’s lack of a precautionary saving motive 
(which would be present without a complete annuities market) and possibly also the lack of bequests. 
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a steady state value, with these shocks again following an AR(1) process.  These productivity 
shocks will affect the market returns to labor and capital at each date t, wt and rt.8 
 While there is no immigration in our model as described so far, we can consider the 
effects of a one-time migration shock by introducing a sudden, one-time inflow of individuals 
with an age profile based on that of existing immigrant flows.  We assume immigrants enter the 
social security system upon arrival, with no credit for earlier years, and that they bring no capital 
but have the same productivity as domestic workers, as is necessary in our model with identical 
individuals in each age cohort.9 
 We calibrate the various shocks as follows: for fertility, mortality, and productivity, we 
assume a one-time shock followed by decay based on an AR(1) process.  Based on estimates 
using postwar U.S. data (details available on request), we set the AR coefficient equal to 0.9 for 
each of these processes, and consider the effects of the largest of each type of shock experienced 
during the period, which (in our model) translates into a productivity shock of 4 percent, a 
fertility shock of 18 percent, and a mortality shock of 4 percent, all relative to their respective 
baseline levels.10  Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of the population age structure after a 
shock that increases the fertility rate at every child-bearing age by 18 percent.  Starting with a 
smooth initial population structure, there is a jump up in the young population by year 10.  By 
                                                 
8 While productivity shocks hit both returns to capital and wage rates, it would also be straightforward to evaluate 
separate shocks to the two processes by introducing another shock that affects only wages, via a shift in the age-
wage productivity profile, ea, or only returns to capital, via stochastic deprecation.  We have considered the effects 
of adding stochastic depreciation to the model, following the calibration of Ambler and Paquet (1994) in terms of 
the relative size of productivity and depreciation shocks and the latter being serially uncorrelated.  The spreading of 
such shocks is nearly the same under all variants of social security we analyze, and hence has little effect on our 
conclusions.  Therefore, we do not present these results below.  We conjecture that this finding relates to the 
depreciation shock being short-lived but leave additional consideration to future research. 
9 Having different economic state variables than domestic residents of the same age, immigrants choose different 
consumption and labor supply paths, even though we assume they have the same labor productivity and preferences. 
10 Because the model is nonlinear, one cannot simply scale the results down proportionally to estimate the effects of 
smaller shocks, but we found little qualitative impact on our results for shocks half as large. 
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year 50, there is a broader increase in the population showing both the initial fertility shock and a 
smoothed echo effect of this initial shock.  In the final steady state, the population, shown in 
Figure 3, is larger as a consequence of the shock, but the original age structure is restored.  
 Figure 3 also shows the comparable population evolution in response to a shock that 
increases mortality rates uniformly across all ages by 4 percent.  This shock reduces the elderly 
and hence overall population by year 10, but the reduction disappears over time as mortality rates 
return to their original levels.  Unlike in the case of a shock to fertility, where the population is 
permanently higher, under a mortality shock (given our assumption that changes in mortality 
occur only after age 60 and therefore do not interact with child bearing) the population has 
returned in the final steady state to its pre-shock pattern and level.  For migration, we consider a 
large shock based on recent history.  In particular, we assume a positive immigration shock equal 
to 0.5 percent of population, roughly the order of magnitude of the increase in net immigration 
into Germany in 2015 over recent historical levels.11  Figure 4 shows the profile we use, based 
on immigrants to Germany in 2014.12  The impact on total population, relative to the no-shock 
trajectory, appears in Figure 3, along with those of the other two demographic shocks.13  
 Finally, we include the government sector in the model, consisting of two components, 
general government and the public pension system.  General government follows a parsimonious 
specification of government purchases as consisting of age-based and non-age-based 
components, with the age-based components (e.g., education spending, old-age medical care) 
held constant (except for trend productivity growth) relative to their respective population groups 
and non-age-based components (e.g., defense spending) held constant (except for productivity 
                                                 
11 https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Migration/Tables/MigrationTotal.html. 
12 These data come from Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_IMM2CTZ. 
13 Note that, unlike in the case of a fertility shock, the population level overshoots in the case of the migration shock 
because a greater share of the immigrant population is of childbearing age. 
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growth) relative to total population.  We break spending down into age-specific and non-age-
specific categories and hold spending for each category, i, constant at gi per member of the 
relevant population, Ni, for i = y, m, and o (young, middle-aged, and old) or for the total 
population.  That is, overall general government spending at any date t equals: 
 
(2) GOVt = gyNyt+ gmNmt + goNot + gn(Nyt+Nmt+Not) 
 
We solve for the values of gi by entering relative values of spending (gN) in each of the four 
categories, taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 11) – .306, .172, .141. and .381, 
respectively – and then scaling them so that government spending equals the exogenously 
determined level of revenue in the initial steady state.  During the transition, we keep these 
government spending weights, gi, constant except for trend productivity growth, so that 
government spending grows smoothly except for changes due to demographic shifts. 
 General government is funded by proportional income and consumption taxes; we ignore 
the use of government debt for the general government budget.  In the initial steady state, we set 
the income tax to 20 percent and the consumption tax equal to 3 percent, which are similar to 
recent estimates for the U.S. tax system from Auerbach (2002).  Because shocks may cause 
required spending and revenue for given tax rates to fluctuate, we let the consumption tax rate 
vary to ensure annual budget balance for the general government.14 
a. Modeling Public Pensions 
 In our analysis, we begin with a consideration of the actual U.S. social security system, in 
which we assume that there is year-by-year cash-flow balance but in which there may be 
                                                 
14 For the productivity shock, this tax rate falls to 1.5 percent (due to a higher tax base) before rebounding.  For the 
fertility shock, the tax rate rises to 3.9 percent (to cover higher government spending on the young) before declining.  
For the smaller mortality and fertility shocks, the tax rate fluctuates narrowly between 2.97 and 3.02 percent. 
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different assumptions with respect to the mix of benefit and tax adjustments used to maintain 
annual cash-flow balance in the presence of shocks.15  
 For any version of the U.S. system, we calculate benefits roughly as under current law, 
taking the average of past labor earnings, inflated by wage growth between the date of earnings 
and the date of benefits receipt to calculate average indexed monthly earnings.16  We then solve 
for the payroll tax needed for budget balance, according to the expression, 
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where θt is the payroll tax in year t, wj,t is the wage rate of an age-j individual in year t, Nj,t is the 
population of age j in year t, AIMEt is the average indexed monthly earnings for an individual 
born in year t, and Rt is the replacement rate in year t.  We set θ = .106 in the initial steady state, 
consistent with the current OASI portion of the payroll tax for the United States, and solve for R 
according the expression (3).  During the transition, when shocks occur, we adjust either R, θ, or 
both annually to ensure that (3) continues to hold, with the relative adjustments of R and 
θ depending on the fraction of the budget adjustment assumed to come through benefits.  
 After consideration of variants of the U.S. system, we will also evaluate systems in 
Germany and Sweden.  For the German system, which also basically requires annual cash-flow 
balance, we follow the description in Auerbach and Lee (2011).  Each beneficiary at date t 
receives the same benefit, Bt, so that budget balance requires that 
                                                 
15 This is a simplification of the actual working of the U.S. social security system, which maintains a small trust fund 
and by law requires no adjustment until the trust fund is exhausted, at which time benefits must fall to maintain a 
zero trust fund balance. Our modeling of different tax and benefit adjustments is meant to reflect alternative 
outcomes of the political process rather than simply the rules of the existing system. 
16 For simplicity, we include all years of work in this calculation, rather than the 35 years with highest earnings, as 
currently used for the US system. 
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The benefit itself evolves from one year to the next according to the following formula: 
 
(5)  𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡−1(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡−1)𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡−2(1−𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡−2) ∙ �1 − .25 ∙ �𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 �� 
 
where wt is the aggregate wage in year t, normalized for age-specific productivity differences, 
and PRt is the pensioners’ ratio in year t, which we define to be the ratio of the adult population 
above the age of pension receipt (age > 66) to those of working age (ages 21-66).  While 
expression (5) determines how benefits evolve over time, it does not fix the level of benefits.  To 
facilitate comparison with the U.S. systems, we fix B in the initial steady state so that expression 
(4) is satisfied by the same payroll tax rate as is assumed for the U.S. systems.  During the 
transition, the benefit evolves according to expression (5) and the tax rate θ is determined so that 
expression (4) is satisfied.  Thus, both B and θ will change from year to year during the 
transition, and so the German system resembles a variant of the U.S. system that adjusts both 
taxes and benefits, although not necessarily one for which the adjustment shares are constant. 
 The other system we consider, a variant of the existing Swedish system, differs from the 
others in that (1) only benefits are adjusted; and (2) there is a trust fund that serves as a buffer 
stock.  It is a notional defined contribution (NDC) system, in which each worker accumulates 
notional pension wealth (NPW) in a virtual account and then receives an annuity based on NPW 
accumulated as of retirement.  The system uses a rate of return that is intended to be more 
sustainable for an unfunded system, equal to the growth rate of the wage level, and has an 
additional mechanism, referred to as a balancing mechanism, to adjust this rate of return further 
if a measure of system sustainability based on explicit and implicit assets and liabilities deviates 
 15 
from its target ratio.  The balancing mechanism in the actual Swedish system is asymmetric, 
lowering the rate of return when the funding ratio is low but never increasing the rate of return 
when the funding ratio is high, but we modify this in our analysis in order to generate a stable 
steady state for the system and to allow comparison with the other systems, which have no trust 
fund accumulation.  We also set the rate of return equal to the growth rate of wages rather than of 
the wage level, to take account of labor force growth.  A sketch of our modified version of the 
Swedish system follows.  Auerbach and Lee (2011) provide further details. 
 During working years, individual i accumulates notional pension wealth at the beginning 
of period t, NPWit, according to the formula: 
 
(6) NPWit = NPWit-1⋅(1+rit-1) + Tit-1 
 
where Tit-1 equals the individual’s payroll taxes at the end of period t-1 and rit-1 is the system’s 
notional rate of return in period t-1.  In the “normal” regime (when the balancing mechanism 
doesn’t bind), r equals the rate of growth of total wages during the same period, g. 
 Upon reaching the retirement age, R, which we will mark by the exogenous age of benefit 
receipt used in all of our systems, the individual gets an annuity based on the value of that 
individual’s notional pension wealth at that date; if i is indexed by the individual’s year of birth, 
this would be NPWi,i+R.  The annuity payment at the end of year i+R equals: 
 
(7) xi,i+R = NPWi,i+R/� (1 + ?̅?𝑔)−(𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖−𝑃𝑃+1) 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=𝑖𝑖+𝑃𝑃 � 
 
where ?̅?𝑔 is the long-run average growth rate of wages, g, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝑃𝑃,𝑡𝑡 is the survival probability of 
generation i between the retirement date and date t, and T is the maximum lifespan.  Since 
realized wage growth in any given year will not equal ?̅?𝑔, the annuity payment at the end of year 
i+R+1 is adjusted up or down by the difference between ?̅?𝑔 and realized growth, gi+R+1, between 
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year i+R and year i+R+1.  Thus, the actual annuity will be level if the growth rate actually 
equals ?̅?𝑔, but otherwise it will grow or fall each year according to the realized value of gt. 
 Because there is nothing built into the benefit calculation just described that ensures that 
benefits and taxes will be equal in any given year, the system can accumulate debt or assets.  The 
actual system has a balancing mechanism that is activated when a “balance ratio”, bt, falls below 
a threshold of 1, while we also apply the mechanism whenever the balance ratio is above 1.
 The balance ratio (suppressing subscripts, since all are in the same year) is defined by: 
 
(8) 𝑏𝑏 = 𝐹𝐹+𝐶𝐶
𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁+𝑃𝑃
 
 
where F equals financial assets accumulated in the system, positive or negative; NPW is 
aggregate notional pension wealth as of that date for all individuals below age R; P is the present 
value of remaining annuity payments to all retirees based on the discount rate ?̅?𝑔 (that is, 
assuming that each retiree’s annuity remains constant at its current value, and discounting these 
level payments using the gross discount factor (1 + ?̅?𝑔)); and C is the so-called “contribution 
asset,” meant to approximate the present value of future tax payments by non-retired current 
participants.  It equals the three-year moving average value of tax payments times the three-year 
moving average of “turnover duration,” which equals the average length of time between tax 
payments and benefit receipt.  We calculate the turnover duration in year t as the average 
(weighted by benefits) age of benefit receipt in year t minus the average (weighted by taxes) age 
of tax payment in year t.  Note that four measures, F, C, NPW, and P, are all backward-looking. 
 When the balancing mechanism is in effect (in our modeling, whenever b ≠ 1 and so 
essentially always outside the steady state), the credited gross rate of return is not (1+gt) but 
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(1+gt) bt and the annuity in each year is adjusted up or down from the previous year by [(1+ gt) bt 
– (1+g�)]/(1+g�) rather than (gt – g�)/(1+g�). 
In a steady state, the Swedish system must have constant values of the balance ratio, b, 
and the ratio of financial assets to some measure of aggregate activity, e.g., total wages, F.  As 
we have modeled the system, a steady state occurs when (F, b) = (0, 1).  That is, the system is 
such that, with a constant growth rate and no trust-fund assets (F = 0), taxes and benefits will be 
equal and the balance ratio, b, will equal 1.  The results presented below are for 
parameterizations where this “normal” steady state in the Swedish system is unique and stable. 
But there is no assurance of stability or uniqueness more generally.17   
 For all public pension systems, we assume that individuals perceive some linkage 
between social security benefits and contributions, that is, that a portion of payroll taxes are 
viewed as being offset by the incremental benefits they generate.  The higher the perceived tax-
benefit linkage, the lower the labor supply distortion caused by the payroll taxes.  We follow 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and set the tax-benefit linkage at 0.25, meaning that individuals 
ignore one fourth of payroll taxes when making labor supply decisions.18 
                                                 
17 Indeed, for many reasonable parameter combinations, this equilibrium is unstable, and the only stable steady state 
is one for which F > 0 and b > 1.  For our base case parameter assumptions, for example, stability is just satisfied – a 
small increase in the pure rate of discount, δ, leads to instability.  Stability analysis of a simpler version of the model 
(with three periods and no feedback effects of the capital-labor ratio on factor prices) confirms based on a 
computation of eigenvalues that the “normal” equilibrium (F, b) = (0, 1) is stable only for interest rates below some 
critical threshold.  For higher interest rates, a perturbation starting at this equilibrium pushes the economy toward the 
alternative equilibrium, for which trust fund assets may be quite high and, as a result, the taxes needed to finance 
benefits quite low.  A possible intuition for this result is that, when a shock pushes taxes and hence trust fund assets 
above zero, these assets then accumulate faster than the increase in benefits, with this process continuing until 
benefits get sufficiently high to absorb the increasing trust fund interest.  This suggests that there may be powerful 
forces in the direction of asset accumulation within the actual Swedish system, where the balancing mechanism does 
not apply for shocks that increase trust-fund assets and drive the balance ratio above 1, although this is only a 
conjecture given the various simplifying assumptions made in the construction of our model of the economy. 
18 While one might expect there to be differences in linkage among the systems, based on their transparency and 
within-cohort redistribution, we lack evidence on such variation and do not anticipate that such differences would 
exert a major influence in the extent of smoothing of shocks. 
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b. Solution of the Model 
To consider the solution of the model, first assume that there are no shocks to mortality, 
fertility or productivity.  In this case, the economy eventually follows a steady state path, so we 
start by solving for this steady state, using the Gauss-Seidel solution technique laid out in 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).  Now, suppose that the economy is initially in this steady state, 
in year 1, and is then hit by one of the four types of shocks in year 2, with no further shocks 
thereafter (but the fertility, mortality and productivity shocks fading out only gradually in 
accordance with the AR(1) specifications for each type of shock).  Since the shocks eventually 
die out completely, the economy will gradually return to the same steady state, assuming that the 
shock does not induce any permanent change in the social security system.19   
 To solve for the transition path, we assume that the shocks occur by surprise in year 2, 
after which all agents in the economy are endowed with perfect foresight.  Thus, transition back 
to the steady state corresponds to a perfect foresight transition path, along which the actual paths 
of all variables are taken into account in household and firm optimization decisions at each date.   
c. Measuring the Smoothing of Shocks by Public Pensions  
Once the transition path is determined, we can calculate the impact of each particular 
type of shock on each cohort’s welfare.  Based on the expected utility given in expression (1), we 
calculate the wealth equivalent of the cohort’s utility change as the scalar that, when multiplied 
by the household’s steady-state vector of consumption and leisure, equalizes steady state utility 
and actual utility along the economy’s transition path in the presence of the shock.  The wealth 
                                                 
19 Such changes do not occur in the U.S. system or in our variant of the Swedish system (because the balancing 
mechanism forces the balance ratio back to 1 and financial assets to zero).  Under the German system, by contrast, 
there is no terminal condition to guarantee such invariance in the long-run system, since all that is determined is how 
benefits and taxes adjust in each year to maintain cash-flow budget balance.  In our simulations, however, the post-
transition tax rate in the German system is very close to the original one. 
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equivalent is an index that measures the money-metric loss or gain induced by the corresponding 
shock, scaled by the cohort’s present value of resources in the absence of the shock.  By 
comparing wealth equivalents for a given shock in the absence of social security and under a 
particular social security system, we gain an estimate of the extent to which that scheme 
mitigates or exacerbates the shock for a given cohort. 
For shocks to productivity growth, the wealth equivalent as just described will give us a 
clear measure of changes in well-being due to the shocks.  For shocks to fertility and mortality, 
however, the issue is more complicated, because the expected number of individual-years of 
consumption and leisure change.  For example, higher fertility will increase the number of 
children-years and lead the household to shift more resources to children; higher mortality will 
reduce the resources that the household wishes to devote to consumption and leisure in later 
periods of adult life.  These changes complicate comparisons of household well-being.  For 
example, simply having more children would lower the measured level of utility (since γ < 1), 
even if every element of the vectors of consumption and leisure were the same. 
To deal with this issue, we measure wealth equivalents using the demographic parameters 
that would apply in the absence of shocks.  That is, we measure the utility of consumption and 
leisure profiles in transition relative to those in the absence of shocks using the mortality and 
fertility rates that would apply in the absence of shocks.20  With this approach, the wealth 
equivalent for a household will exceed 1 if and only if the household’s observed vector of 
consumption and leisure would be preferred to the bundle chosen in the absence of shocks, for 
the fertility and mortality profiles that would apply in the absence of shocks.21 
                                                 
20 One could also perform the comparison holding the demographic parameters at their values in the presence of 
shocks.  The key is to hold the parameters constant in the comparison. 
21 Our approach to measuring relative well-being makes sense if changes in fertility and mortality are due to 
exogenous shocks, but the issue would be more complicated if fertility and mortality shocks reflect endogenous 
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To measure the effectiveness of any social security system at smoothing shocks, we use 
the variance of wealth equivalents, where we scale each cohort’s wealth equivalent by the trend 
level of the economy (based on population and productivity growth), discounted using the rate of 
return to capital.  The logic of using a reduction in variance to measure smoothing is that 
variance provides a second-order approximation of the welfare loss from fluctuations in 
outcomes for a concave social welfare function.  Our scaling is intended to avoid having our 
measure of volatility depend on a simple shift in resources to earlier or later generations that a 
social security system might produce.22  Likewise, we do not focus on how different systems 
affect mean levels of wealth equivalents under different shocks, which would pick up changes in 
economic efficiency that are not our focus here. 
3. Basic Results 
 The effectiveness of any social security system in smoothing shocks will depend on both 
the nature of the shocks and the system’s response mechanism. It is well understood that shocks 
of longer duration will be less susceptible to smoothing, to the extent that a broad range of 
cohorts already experiences similar effects.  But a related point is that, for a given duration, some 
shocks, for example a productivity shock, will affect a wider range of cohorts than, say, a 
mortality shock, since the former directly affects returns to labor and capital and all those who 
receive them, while the latter primarily affects only older cohorts.  Finally, of course, social 
                                                                                                                                                             
behavior by the household.  For example, fertility might change because of a reduction in the cost of raising 
children.  To evaluate adequately the welfare effects of such a change, it would be necessary to incorporate 
household fertility decisions explicitly in our model. 
22 That is, a transfer of resources from each person in one birth year yields (1+r)/(1+n)(1+g) dollars per individual 
scaled by the initial level of individual resources in the next birth year, where r is the rate of return, n is the 
population growth rate, and g  is the productivity growth rate.  Thus, for a system that shifted resources across 
cohorts so that positive and negative shocks were shifted into the future, the simple variance of wealth equivalents 
would rise if (1+r)/(1+n)(1+g) > 1.  This normalization has relatively little impact except for the Swedish system, 
which through its buffer-stock mechanism produces considerable shifting across cohorts for some shocks.  
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security systems differ in the extent to which they rely on taxes versus benefits in maintaining 
cash-flow balance, and this affects their ability to smooth shocks that hit different cohorts, as do 
differences in the way that benefit and tax adjustments occur.  Shocks that hit younger cohorts 
might more easily be spread using taxes, just as benefits might be used to address older cohorts; 
and benefit adjustments, especially, differ in the way they hit different cohorts.       
 Figure 5 provides a summary evaluation of the different social security systems in terms 
of effectiveness at smoothing the various shocks considered.  For each shock, the figure plots the 
variance of wealth equivalents.  Because of differences in variances across shocks, we plot them 
using a logarithmic scale and provide further detail on the two largest shocks (to productivity and 
fertility) using different expanded scales in the lower panel of the figure.  To illustrate the 
relative effectiveness of benefit and tax adjustments, we show results for versions of the U.S. 
system ranging from no benefit adjustment to no tax adjustment.  The entries on the right in the 
figure are for the German and Swedish systems and for the benchmark case of no social security.  
 The figure includes a number of interesting results.  First, the shocks vary substantially in 
their underlying importance, with the effects of productivity shocks an order of magnitude larger 
than those of fertility shocks and three orders of magnitude larger than those of mortality and 
migration shocks.  Second, focusing initially on the different variants of the U.S. system, we see 
that the relative effectiveness of taxes and benefits at smoothing shocks varies by the type of 
shock.  As mentioned above, mortality and migration shocks are most effectively smoothed in 
the U.S. system when only tax adjustments are used, productivity shocks are most effectively 
smoothed when only benefit adjustments are used, and the variance for fertility shocks is lowest 
when adjustment relies equally on tax and benefit adjustments.  Third, the ability of social 
security to smooth shocks of a given magnitude varies considerably across the types of shocks, 
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with a substantial proportional reduction possible for the effects of the mortality shock but little 
reduction for productivity, consistent with the intuition discussed above.  Fourth, even where a 
reduction in variance is possible, some combinations of tax and benefit adjustments fail to 
smooth shocks.  For example, while reliance primarily on tax adjustments lessens variance under 
the migration shock, variance increases when the primary adjustment is through benefits.  
Finally, considering the performance of the German and Swedish systems, we observe that the 
German system performs quite well relative to the U.S. system, with actually a lower variance 
than the lowest U.S. variant for both productivity and fertility shocks, even though the best-
performing U.S. variant differs for these two shocks.  The Swedish system, on the other hand, 
performs rather poorly, except in the case of the fertility shock.   
 To get a sense of what may underlie these results, we consider the effects of these shocks 
on different cohorts.  Figures 6 and 7, respectively, display wealth equivalents and payroll tax 
rates for the different systems for each of the four shocks.  (Note that the vertical scales in each 
figure differ across shocks.)  For the U.S. system, we evaluate three variants, with only taxes 
adjusted, only benefits adjusted, and equal adjustment of the two. 
a. Productivity Shock 
 As one would expect, a positive productivity shock increases well-being (Figure 6, top 
left panel), with the largest effects being experienced by the generations reaching adulthood 
around the time that the productivity shock hits.  While the effects differ slightly across the 
different social security systems, these differences are very minor compared to the common 
impact of the shock itself.   
 All five systems appear to concentrate gains slightly more among cohorts reaching 
adulthood around the time the productivity shock hits.  This makes sense given that unfunded 
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social security systems provide a rate of return based on the economic growth rate.  The 
productivity shock makes social security a “less bad” deal, a source of gain that is absent when 
there is no social security.  The U.S. tax adjust system appears to shift the gains slightly toward 
younger generations.  Insight into the reason for this relationship comes from the top left panel of 
Figure 7, which shows the time path of the social security tax rate under the different systems.  
The tax rate is constant, by assumption, under the U.S. benefit adjust and Swedish systems.  
Under the U.S. tax adjust system, the tax rate drops initially, since it is easier to finance social 
security benefits with a more productive work force, and then gradually rises back to its initial 
level.  Thus, younger workers get an added benefit through lower payroll taxes than in the other 
systems.  The German system, on the other hand, appears to help the elderly slightly more and 
young workers relatively less.  Unlike in the U.S. tax adjust system (and the U.S. both adjust 
system),  the German system’s payroll tax rate overshoots its long-run level, because the 
productivity shock has dissipated but left in its wake an impact on social security benefits, which 
are based on lifetime earnings.  That is, workers whose productivity has reverted to its original 
level must pay elevated benefits to those who worked during a higher-productivity period.   
 As indicated, the various social security systems appear to provide little, if any, 
cushioning of the productivity shock, and actually increase the benefit among those already most 
helped by the shock, for systems that use tax adjustments.  This is consistent with our finding in 
Figure 5 that the systems provide little, if any, smoothing of the productivity shock, and that 
systems relying on benefit adjustment tend to perform better. 
b. Mortality Shock 
 To interpret the wealth effects for the mortality shock, it is important to remember that 
they assess the change in the bundle of consumption and leisure using pre-shock mortality 
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profiles.  By this measure, we would expect a shortening of lifespan to increase well-being, 
ceteris paribus, because it would make more resources available during the period in which an 
individual is alive.23 This outcome is quite evident in Figure 6 for the no-social security case, in 
which older generations – those who are primarily affected by the temporary increase in 
mortality, experience an increase in welfare. 
 Why do those reaching adulthood just into the transition experience a small decline in 
welfare, at least in the no-social-security case? Wages dip temporarily, because older generations 
have less reason to save for old age and therefore accumulate less capital.  Hence, those who 
reach adulthood shortly after the transition begins, who themselves will be largely unaffected by 
the mortality shock, experience lower wages and hence lower welfare.  The same general 
equilibrium effects help older generations further, through a temporary rise in interest rates. 
 This pattern of effects across generations is substantially modified under the different 
social security systems, being softened under those that involve at least some adjustment of 
social security taxes.  Under the U.S. tax adjust system, younger adults actually now gain 
because of the shock, while older generations see their gains reduced.  The reason for this shift is 
the reduced payroll tax.  A mortality shock temporarily reduces the old-age dependency ratio and 
hence allows a reduction in payroll taxes.  (Unlike the case of the productivity shock, there is no 
subsequent need for a payroll tax increase under the U.S. tax-adjust system.)  Thus, a social 
security system that incorporates payroll tax adjustments spreads the gains from a mortality 
shock, offsetting the negative general equilibrium effects on young workers’ wages and also 
distributing to them some of the surplus made possible by the lower consumption needs of the 
                                                 
23  Put another way, the pre-shock mortality profile assigns more weight to future periods of life than is consistent 
with the resources individuals must put aside for those periods, given actual life expectancy.   
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elderly.  This smoothing is present to a lesser extent under the German system and the mixed 
U.S. system as well. 
 With only benefits adjusted, there is little smoothing, or even a reinforcement of the 
underlying effects of the shocks.  The Swedish system, which incorporates survival probabilities 
in its annuity calculation, rewards those retiring around the time of the shock with higher annuity 
payments, reinforcing the annual consumption increase permitted by a faster decumulation of 
private assets.  But this increase in benefits must be paid for by subsequent generations in the 
form of lower benefits, causing young workers to be even worse off than without social security. 
 Unlike in the case of productivity shocks, some of the social security systems have a 
large smoothing effect, as measured by their impact on wealth equivalents, although adjusting 
only benefits is much less effective for smoothing mortality shocks. 
c. Fertility Shock 
 Recall that we measure welfare effects for fixed fertility profiles.  Ignoring general 
equilibrium effects, we would expect a reduction in well-being for young adults alive at the time 
of the shock, because these adults must commit more resources to children as a result of larger 
family sizes.  (As noted in footnote 20, this ignores the well-being generated by the voluntary 
decision to have more children.) That is indeed what occurs for the simulation in which there is 
no social security system.  Under that scenario, there are essentially no “winners” from the boom 
in fertility.  The biggest losers are those hitting adulthood at the time of the shock, who 
experience the shock’s full magnitude and its effect on their available resources per capita.  But 
older working generations also lose, as young adults’ increased labor supply reduces their wages, 
and younger generations lose, as those hit by the shock are less able to accumulate capital. 
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 With social security systems in place, the incidence of the shocks changes, even though 
the largest impact is still felt by the initial adult cohort.  The patterns of incidence differ across 
the systems according to cohort.  For cohorts in adulthood as of the shock, there is a small loss in 
welfare in the absence of social security, which may be traced to the reduction in wages that 
follows, with a delay, after the shock, due to the increased labor force.  These cohorts are helped 
by systems that adjust benefits, notably the U.S. benefit adjust scheme, presumably because the 
improved system health generated by the lower old-age dependency ratio leads to an increase in 
their retirement benefits.   
 On the other hand, those entering adulthood after the shock are helped more by the U.S. 
tax adjust scheme than the US benefit adjust scheme, which makes sense because these 
individuals hit retirement only after the beneficial effects of the baby boom on the old-age 
dependency ratio have been reversed, while the tax adjustments lower their payroll tax rates 
during working years.  This balance between the effects of adjusting taxes and adjusting benefits 
helps explain why the lowest-variance U.S. system (as shown in Figure 5) is the one that 
includes both adjustments. 
 Perhaps more surprising is that the Swedish system, which is the most beneficial to even 
younger cohorts, with a very long-lasting effect, and has the lowest variance of any of the 
systems.  But this outcome may be understood once one takes into account that the benefit 
adjustments in the Swedish system are not based on achieving cash-flow balance.  Individuals 
working when the system is healthy (because of rapid work-force growth) accumulate Notional 
Pension Wealth (NPW) at a faster rate.  Thus, their eventual benefits may be enhanced, even if 
by the time they retire the growth of aggregate wages has slowed.  Also, because increases in 
NPW have effects on benefits far into the future, the welfare of many cohorts may be affected.  
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d. Migration Shock 
 The relationship between immigration and the viability of PAYG pension systems has 
received ample attention in the literature (e.g., Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999, and Storesletten, 
2000).  But recent events, especially in Europe, provide a reminder that immigration levels may 
also be subject to considerable volatility.  How effective are the different social security systems 
at spreading the economic shocks associated with sudden changes in immigration levels? 
 For the migration shock, the patterns of wealth equivalents are in some ways similar to 
those under a fertility shock, which is not surprising given that both involve additions to the 
population.  However, while in the case of a fertility shock most generations do worse, with the 
migration shock many generations do better, particularly those generations reaching adulthood 
30 to 40 years before the shock, who receive greater benefits when they retire, under the benefit-
adjust Social Security policy. Unlike in the case of the fertility shock, there is no reduction in 
consumption due to child dependency, and therefore no related reduction in capital accumulation 
to fund consumption in retirement.  
Comparing the two lower panels of Figure 6, we note that the effects of the migration shock die 
out more quickly, which is consistent with the shock being treated as a one-time event rather 
than one subject to an AR(1) process.  In terms of the smoothing of shocks, perhaps the most 
noticeable difference between the two types of shocks is in the poorer performance of systems 
that adjust only benefits (the US benefit adjust and Swedish systems) under the migration shock.  
This appears due to the very sharp increase in benefits that follows immediately from a large 
influx of foreign workers, which leads to large increases in the wealth equivalents for workers 
nearing retirement.  At the same time, younger workers are now part of a larger age cohort, 
which will put more pressure on their benefits when they retire.  
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e. Adjustments in the Swedish System 
 As our discussion highlights, the Swedish system, as we have modeled it, is unique 
among the systems we consider of being unfunded on a long-term basis but having financial 
asset accumulation and decumulation available due to buffer shocks.  Figure 8 shows how the 
balance ratio, b, and the fund balance, F, relative to aggregate wages, react to the shocks we have 
considered.  The balance ratio, in the upper panel of the figure, moves quickly to very near 1.0 
following each of the four kinds of shock, but least so in the case of the fertility shock, where 
echo effects in population structure (see Figure 2) continue to cause small fluctuations.   
 The effects on financial assets (shown in the lower panel of the figure) are quite different 
under the four shocks.  For a productivity shock, assets rise sharply in the short run, as only some 
of the additional tax revenues generated go to increased benefits.  Assets then fall as the 
productivity shock decays and the impact of increased NPW accumulation (due to faster growth) 
eats into accumulated assets.  Indeed, fund assets overshoot, becoming negative for a time until 
the slowing of benefit growth catches up with current economic fundamentals.  For a fertility 
shock, the major impact on F is delayed, because the system is only directly affected when the 
larger cohort enters the work force.  When it does, the effect is similar to that of a productivity 
shock, raising asset accumulation right away, before increased accumulation of NPW works to 
offset the asset accumulation.  Unlike in the case of the productivity shock, however, the impact 
is more long-lasting and there is no overshooting, because of the echo effect of future large 
cohorts that keep the initial population shock from dissipating.  For a mortality shock, there is 
little impact at all on trust fund accumulation, because changes in mortality above age 60 have 
no direct impact on the growth of wages, either through work-force growth (fertility) or wage 
growth (productivity).  The small impact observed is due to the indirect effects associated with 
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labor supply and saving responses to the mortality shock.  For a migration shock, the fund 
balance increase is gradual but not as delayed as under the fertility shock, because some migrants 
are already in the labor force and increasing payroll tax contributions.  However, the fund 
balance peaks more rapidly as well, because of the shock’s lack of permanence. 
f. Summary 
 We have found that the various systems vary in their effectiveness at smoothing shocks, 
and also that as a group they smooth some types of shocks more than others.  Given the 
differences in performance for different types of shocks, it is hard to say which system is best at 
smoothing shocks.  However, we can consider overall performance by taking into account the 
relative importance of different shocks.  For example, even though the smoothing of productivity 
shocks is minor, these shocks are by far the most important, in terms of the variance of wealth 
equivalents in the absence of social security; even minor smoothing of productivity shocks may 
be more important than more significant smoothing of, say, mortality shocks, which generate the 
smallest variance of wealth equivalents.  Summing the variances of wealth equivalents under the 
four shocks for each system (as would make sense if each of the shocks occurred independently 
and with equal probability) yields results very similar to those for the productivity shock in 
Figure 5, with the important finding that (1) both the German and Swedish systems reduce the 
variance of wealth equivalents, but also that (2) the variants of the U.S. system that rely heavily 
on tax adjustment actually increase the overall variance of wealth equivalents. 
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 Our simulation model incorporates several simplifying assumptions and parameter 
choices.  To illustrate the impact of such decisions, we consider the effects of two alternative 
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assumptions:  varying one important parameter, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, γ, and 
assuming that the economy is small and open, facing fixed world factor prices. 
a. A Higher Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution   
We first consider a doubling of γ (from 0.35 to 0.7).  For these simulations, we also adjust 
the pure rate of time preference (from -.015 to .0139) to preserve the same interest rate in the 
initial steady state without social security. The patterns are generally quite similar.  However, 
there is a noticeable improvement in the performance of the Swedish system, in terms of the 
variance of wealth equivalents.  This outcome appears to relate to the fact that the Swedish 
system adjusts faster when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher. For example, the 
financial assets converge more quickly to their steady state value of zero. 
 With this improvement in the performance of the Swedish system, it now has an overall 
impact on the variance of wealth equivalents slightly better than the German system. 
b. An Open Economy 
It has long been understood that general equilibrium effects may moderate the effects of 
demographic change.  For example, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio might increase 
the fiscal burden imposed on working generations, but these same generations could enjoy 
increased wage rates as a result of an increase in the capital-labor ratio.  Here, we consider a 
different though related question, how the spreading of shocks depends on such general 
equilibrium effects.  Of course, since all countries are open to a greater or lesser degree, it is also 
substantively important to understand how openness would alter the intergenerational effects of 
shocks under different pension systems. To address this question, we consider the effects of 
keeping returns to labor (in efficiency units) and capital fixed at their initial steady state values, 
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as might occur in a small open economy.  Figure 9 shows the impact of this assumption on 
wealth equivalents for each type of shock, comparable to the base case results in Figure 6. 
Comparing the results yields a number of interesting observations.  For the productivity 
shock, there is a noticeable difference in the effects on generations reaching adulthood around 25 
years into the transition, who do worse in the case of the open economy.  In a closed economy, 
such cohorts enjoy higher wage rates, even though the productivity shock has largely eroded, 
because of a higher capital-labor ratio (generated by savings from higher past income).  Thus, the 
gains from the productivity shock are generally more concentrated in the open economy.  Also, 
the Swedish system now looks slightly better than the others, at least in terms of the spreading of 
the shock near its peak impact. 
For a mortality shock, perhaps the most evident difference associated with the open 
economy is on cohorts hitting adulthood around the time of the shock.  In a closed economy, 
these cohorts suffer a decline in wages, which can reduce their own lifetime welfare, at least for 
some of the social security systems.  In an open economy, these cohorts do better, even in the 
absence of social security where they benefit from lower taxes needed to support other 
government expenditures.  Here, the relative impacts of the different social security systems are 
similar to those in a closed economy. 
The fertility shock has rather different effects on cohorts reaching adulthood between 
roughly 25 and 60 years after the shock, again doing better in the case of the open economy.  
Here, the mechanism is quite straightforward – a large population of workers no longer depresses 
the wage rate and therefore may actually do better, again because of lower taxes to pay for other 
programs (here because of a higher working population, rather than a lower dependent 
population).  For this scenario, social security systems that rely on taxes do relatively worse in 
 32 
the open economy than in the closed economy.  In the case of the closed economy, the fertility 
shock that depresses wages also lessens the fiscal pressure on PAYG social security systems; 
adjusting payroll taxes reduces the burden on those who suffer wage declines, thereby 
cushioning the effects of the shocks.  In the open economy, no such wage decline occurs, so 
reducing payroll taxes does not serve the same cushioning function. 
Finally, for the migration shock, the patterns of wealth equivalents are quite different for 
cohorts around 0, i.e., those reaching adulthood at the time of the shock.  Unlike in the case of a 
fertility shock, where the impact hits later cohorts, the effect here is immediate because the 
population shock involves current workers, not just future ones.  As with the fertility shock, the 
affected working population does better in an open economy, benefiting from a broader 
population of taxpayers to cover general government spending but not suffering a decline in 
wages.  As to social security, the relative performance of the different systems again is somewhat 
worse for systems that adjust taxes, but perhaps the more salient difference from the open 
economy is that all systems do worse in cushioning shocks.  Put another way, without social 
security, the effects of a migration shock on the welfare of different cohorts are much smaller in 
an open economy, once the factor-price channel has been neutralized.  All of the social security 
systems react to the migration shock either by increasing benefits – making older generations 
better off – or by reducing taxes – making younger generations better off – and these transfers 
exaggerate the underlying fluctuations in welfare associated with the shock itself, namely the 
effect of the shock via the general taxes and spending of government. As a consequence, the 
variance of wealth equivalents is lower in the absence of social security than under any of the 
alternative social security schemes. 
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In summary, excluding factor-price responses to the shocks considered here may reduce 
the desirability of using taxes rather than benefits to adjust PAYG social security systems, and 
may also reduce the benefits of social security as a mechanism for smoothing shocks.   
5. Conclusions  
 We have simulated the ways in which different public pension structures spread the 
effects of isolated deterministic macro shocks across the leading and trailing generations in a 
general equilibrium setting.  This enables us to make comparisons of outcomes across systems, 
across kinds of shocks, and across generations.  The impulse-response approach pinpoints the 
particular consequences of different kinds of shocks, making it possible to observe and interpret 
these outcomes in a way that is not possible with stochastic simulations which show us the 
results of a mixture of kinds of shocks initiated at many different times.  
 The general equilibrium setting provides new insights about the effects of shocks filtered 
through different pension structures, which affect the way that shocks alter the saving and labor 
supply behavior of generations.  For example, following a mortality shock, older working age 
generations have less need to save for retirement (life expectancy is shorter and annuity rates of 
return are higher, reflecting higher old age mortality), so capital per worker is reduced and wages 
fall, while the rate of return earned by the elderly on their assets rises.  But these general 
equilibrium effects are modified in different ways by the pension structures, as discussed earlier.   
 Based on our measure of volatility, determined by variations in the wealth equivalents of 
shocks across generations, the pension systems we consider are effective to some degree in 
spreading shocks across generations, at least in some cases.  However, the effectiveness depends 
on the type of shock as well as the choice of parameters.  For some systems, parameterizations 
and shocks, social security systems actually concentrate the effects of shocks.     
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 If we form an overall measure by summing the wealth equivalent variances arising from 
the four kinds of shocks, the most important of which is to productivity, we find that both the 
German and the Swedish systems reduce the variance of this overall measure, while some 
versions of the U.S. system that rely on tax adjustments can actually raise that variance.  In an 
open economy the desirability of using taxes rather than benefits to adjust PAYG social security 
systems is reduced relative to the closed economy, and the open economy setting also reduces 
the benefits of social security as a mechanism for smoothing shocks – indeed a social security 
system can actually amplify the effect of some shocks in an open economy. 
 All of the systems considered here are unfunded systems, and yet they differ in their 
relative reliance on tax adjustments and benefit adjustments and on the extent to which they 
require annual pay-as-you-go balance rather than long-run balance (as under the Swedish 
system).  Allowing a fluctuating buffer stock adds an additional tool for spreading risks across 
cohorts but, as our discussion of system stability highlights, also complicates the task of 
maintaining fiscal balance in an unfunded system.  These findings suggest the need for further 
research regarding the design of unfunded systems that allow short-run fluctuations in annual 
pay-as-you-go balance.
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Figure 1. Baseline Fertility and Mortality Profiles 
(probability of dying or giving birth in a year) 
 
 
Figure 2. Population by Age, Fertility Shock 
(adjusted for trend population growth) 
 Figure 3. Aggregate Population (Normalized by Initial Population), Various Shocks 
 
 
Figure 4. Migration: Age Profile of Immigrant Flow (to Germany in 2014) 
  
 Figure 5. Wealth Equivalent Variances under Different Social Security Systems 
  
 Figure 6: Wealth Equivalents by Year of Adulthood 
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 Figure 7: Social Security Tax Rates by Year 
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 Figure 8a. Balance Ratio, Swedish System 
 
 
Figure 8b. Fund-Wages Ratio, Swedish System 
 
 
 Figure 9: Wealth Equivalents by Year of Adulthood, Open Economy 
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